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It has been nearly 50 years since the United 
States initiated a military operation that 
sprayed approximately 20 million gallons of 
phenoxy herbicides and arsenicals on South 
Vietnam including Agent Orange, a formu-
lation that was contaminated with dioxin. 
Alvin Young has been a major player in mea-
suring and monitoring these herbicides since 
the 1960s. Retired from the Air Force (AF) and 
now receiving support from the herbicide manufacturers 
Dow and Monsanto, Young remains a governmental spokesman 
in post-conflict remediation dealings with Vietnam. His “new” book on 
the issue—actually, a largely unacknowledged compilation of his and 
others’ writing and research—contains some valuable information. This 
value though, must be weighed against a number of serious deficiencies 
in scholarship. 
Young’s book contains a gold mine of data on the herbicides, some 
of which have been out of public view until now. But caveat emptor: 
Page after page of text and many illustrations and photographs are taken 
directly from Young’s prior publications without proper citation. There 
are also many lengthy direct quotations from other authors that appear 
without quotation marks or indents. Setting aside issues of copyright, the 
difficulty for users who wish to cite this book’s contents will be the abso-
lute requirement of locating all references to distinguish original from 
reproduced text. 
A second caveat: Many quotations are taken out of context, 
emphasis has been added without acknowledgement, and other authors’ 
work has in some cases been misinterpreted. For example, Major 
General John Murray—who evaluated military records aspects of 
the now abandoned Agent Orange Study—is quoted as seeming to 
urge abandonment of all military records–based studies with Young’s 
emphasis-added, capitalized, and boldfaced “NOT.” A check in the 
source material, though, will show that Murray’s very next sentence 
reads “It is, of course, understood that eight (8) other studies which 
require determinations of the likelihood of Agent Orange exposure con-
ducted by the Veterans Administration and for which the Joint Services 
Environmental Support Group will provide exposure determinations 
and military record abstractions will rigorously continue” (Murray JE. 
1986. Report to the White House Agent Orange Working Group 
Science Subpanel on Exposure Assessment. Washington DC:Office 
of Science and Technology Policy). Palmer’s work is cited as support-
ing the notion that science cannot contribute to understanding health 
effects of Agent Orange, because there are too many “quality of life 
issues.” A check of source material (Palmer MG. 2005. The Legacy of 
Agent Orange: Empirical Evidence from Central Vietnam. Soc Sci Med 
60:1061–1070) reveals that Palmer did not say this; further, the year of 
his paper is incorrectly cited.
More recently, Young has proposed a new theory to support his 
contention that no U.S. troops were directly sprayed upon. He asserts 
that because there were no reports of U.S. casualties resulting from 
attacks by the fighter planes that escorted the spray planes, no troops 
could have been in harm’s way, and he cites Flanagan, a retired AF pilot 
who wrote of his varied experiences in Vietnam. In fact, Flanagan’s 
description of a spray mission disparages the Army recordkeeping on 
which Young relies: “Failure was never recognized … friendly casual-
ties could be failures, but they, too, were never identified” (Flanagan JF. 
1992. Vietnam Above The Treetops: A Forward Air Controller Reports. 
New York:Praeger).
In the interest of full disclosure, Young describes our methodology 
for updating and correcting herbicide spray records as demonstrating a 
“woeful lack of understanding” of AF reporting procedures. We must 
point out in response that our work (Stellman JM, Stellman SD. 2003. 
Characterizing Exposure of Veterans to Agent Orange and Other 
Herbicides Used in Vietnam: Final Report. Washington, DC:National 
Academies Press) was performed in collaboration with the persons at 
the Department of Defense (DoD) who were the most knowledgeable 
about these procedures—the Center for Research on Unit Records—and 
co-authored by Col. Christian (retired), former director of the DoD Joint 
Services Environmental Support Group. Young discounts the ability of 
spray plane navigators to know where they were or pilots to accurately 
spray their targets—thereby dismissing the utility of the voluminous 
spray records available, despite much evidence to the contrary.
Some assertions in the book either are disingenuous or contradict 
Young’s earlier work. Young rationalizes in this book that the omission of 
maximum dioxin contaminant levels from the military specifications for 
herbicide quality occurred because not enough was known and measure-
ment was difficult; but two decades ago his edited volume stated that 
“the manufacturers of trichlorophenol and of 2,4,5-T had been aware for 
many years that this class of compounds and particularly their impuri-
ties produced a toxic reaction in humans … the same manufacturers had 
developed, as early as 1941, a … bioassay … to monitor the production 
of the herbicide” (Young AL, Reggiani GM. 1988. Agent Orange and 
Its Associated Dioxin: Assessment of a Controversy. New York:Elsevier). 
Indeed, in 1965 Dow Chemical Company’s V.K. Rowe convened a 
highly unusual meeting of his toxicology counterparts from competitor 
companies to warn that the herbicide was dangerous and that processes 
needed cleaning up. Dow closed down and rebuilt its own feedstock 
operations to manage the problem. The military specifications never once 
mentioned dioxin for the duration of the war.
Science also seems to have ended in the 1970s and early 1980s 
for Young. Johnston Island, the final resting place for Agent Orange 
before its incineration at sea, had no important problems in 1978 
according to Young. However, a 1986 AF reassessment found marine 
biota with up to 472 ppb dioxin, subsoil with 510 ppb dioxin, and 
682,247 ppb of 2,4,5-T (Huse G, et al. 1991. Preliminary Public 
Health, Environmental Risk, and Data Requirements Assessment for 
the Herbicide Orange Storage Site at Johnston Island. Brooks Air Force 
Base, TX:Occupational and Environmental Health Directorate). 
Finally, how very much beside the point is the book’s quibbling 
about whether spray estimates differ by a few percent? Here we are in 
2010, some 38 years since the last spray mission overflew hamlets and 
fields of our ally, the South Vietnamese, and we still cannot answer 
these questions: Were there health consequences? Just how many “hot 
spots” are there? Were veterans who served in heavily sprayed areas more 
likely to contract illnesses than those who did not? Are there adverse 
effects among the people of Gulfport, Mississippi, through which mil-
lions of gallons passed, too much of it in leaky barrels? The Institute of 
Medicine, the editors of Nature, Congress, and many others have repeat-
edly requested that studies be done—to no avail. 
These are profoundly important questions still awaiting an answer. 
Young contends that science is being “filtered” through the public’s 
confused perceptions. But while some confusion may exist, the predomi-
nant sentiment is dismay. If there is one thing that this compendium of 
reprinted materials shows us, it is that there is a wealth of data that can 
be used to answer the many open environmental questions.
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